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Abstract
This paper introduces elementary concepts needed to deﬁne a formal, computationally oriented, model for
intentional systems. First, the paper brieﬂy reviews the central concept of intentionality, to contextualize
the work. Then, it characterizes the main types of intentional acts, deﬁnes the concepts of intentional
process and intentional system, and gives the basis of the formal model of such systems. Next in a brief
case study, a formal model for a sample constative intentional system is presented and discussed. Following,
the features that are still lacking to achieve a full-ﬂedged formal model of intentional systems are indicated.
Finally, the relationship between the formal model of intentional systems introduced here and the usual
semantical models for formal languages is discussed.
Keywords: Phenomenology, intentionality, intentional processes, intentional systems, formal semantics.
1 Introduction
Phenomenology [10] is the area of Philosophy that studies the structure of experience
and the acts of consciousness, reﬂexive or not, that constitute it.
The characteristic feature of an act of consciousness is its intentionality, that
is, its directedness toward an object. Acts of consciousness are, thus, intentional
acts. Temporal sequences of intentional acts constitute what may be called inten-
tional processes. We call intentional system any system that performs an intentional
process.
In this paper, we introduce elements for a formal model of intentional systems
which is computationally oriented, meaning that it is conceived having its computa-
1 CNPq provided partial ﬁnancial support for this work.
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Fig. 1. The Husserlian square.
tional realization, through agent technologies, in multiagent systems [11]. We base
the work on Edmund Husserl’s analysis of intentional acts [6].
The paper is structured as follows. In Sect. 2, we review the concepts of inten-
tional act and intentional process, the main background concepts of the work. In
Sect. 3 we introduce the formal concept of intentional system, on the basis of which
we realize the formal modeling of intentional processes. Sect. 4 presents a simple
case study, giving a concrete example of the applicability of the ideas presented
here. Sect. 5 is the Conclusion, where some related works and some general issues
are discussed.
2 Intentional Acts and Intentional Processes
2.1 Husserl’s Concept of Intentional Act
The way we construe in formal, computationally oriented, terms Husserl’s analysis
of intentional acts [6] is illustrated in Fig. 1, where we picture, in what we call the
Husserlian square, four constituents of intentional acts. They are 3 :
- Objects: the set of things and facts in the world toward which intentional acts
may be directed; formally denoted by Objs.
- Access actions: the eﬀective actions 4 through which the objects may be accessed,
as such actions occur in the intentional systems that realize the intentional acts;
formally denoted by AActs.
- Noeses: the set of ideated essences of access actions, as each such essence (noesis)
is grasped phenomenologically 5 ; formally denoted by Noes.
- Noemata: the set of ideated essences of objects and facts, as each such essence
(noema) is grasped phenomenologically; formally denoted by Nmts.
The relationships between the various constituents of the intentional acts are:
3 Note how the Husserlian square subsumes, through its subjective × objective, and eidetic × ontic cat-
egorization, the distinction between the epistemic and the ontological senses of the subjective × objective
distinction, extensively elaborated by Searle in, e.g., [9].
4 “Eﬀective” in the computational sense, i.e., endowed with only ﬁnitary features, restricting their appli-
cability to (parts of) objects that can be accessed in ﬁnite time.
5 The phenomenological method of grasping objects and mental actions is observational, aiming at the
description of the manifest aspects of the phenomena of consciousness that it studies [6].
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• Functional relationships:
· A : AActs → Objs is the access function;
· S : Noes → Nmts is the sense function;
such that:
· if A(a) = o, we say that access action a can access object o, when executed;
· if S(ns) = nm, we say that the noema nm is the sense of the noesis ns.
• Relational relationships:
· P ⊆ Noes×AActs is the performance relation;
· F ⊆ Nmts×Objs is the fulﬁllment relation;
· I ⊆ Noes×Objs is the intentional relation;
· C ⊆ Nmts×AActs is the compatibility relation;
such that:
· if a ∈ P[ns ], we say that the access action a performs the noesis ns, when
executed;
· if o ∈ F[nm], we say that the object o fulﬁlls the noema nm;
· if o ∈ I[ns], we say that the object o is intended by the noesis ns;
· if a ∈ C[nm], we say that the action a is compatible with the noema nm.
If an act performed by an intentional system is intentional then its structure ﬁts
the structure of the Husserlian square. That is, we deﬁne, in a preliminary way 6 :
Deﬁnition 2.1 An intentional act is a tuple of the form
(ns, aact ,nt , obj ) ∈ Noes×AActs×Nmts×Objs
The universe of all possible intentional acts is denoted by IActs.
2.2 Intentional Processes
By a (general) process we understand any time-indexed sequence of sets of actions.
We say that a process is intentional if at each time instant at least one of the actions
that occur in the process, at that time, is an intentional act.
An intentional process is said to be pure if all its sets of actions are constituted
only by intentional acts.
For simplicity, we consider here intentional processes constituted only by non-
empty sets with just one single act, which happens to be intentional, that is, an
element of IActs. And, we take time to be discrete and linearly ordered, denoted
by T = 0, 1, 2, ... .
Under such conditions, we may deﬁne, in a reductive way:
Deﬁnition 2.2 An intentional process is any time-indexed sequence ip : T →
IActs of intentional acts.
With the set of intentional acts occurring at time t denoted by ipt, for t =
0, 1, 2, . . ., we may write ip = 〈ip0, ip1, ip2, . . .〉. Each ipt is said to be a step of ip.
We denote the universe of all possible intentional processes by IProc.
6 The concept of intentional act is further reﬁned in Sect. 2.3.
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Fig. 2. The Husserlian triangles of the intentional and actional semantics of intentional acts.
2.3 Formal Semantics of Intentional Acts
We determine the formal semantics of intentional acts through a combination of two
types of semantical functions, the intentional semantical function and the actional
semantical function:
Deﬁnition 2.3 An intentional semantical function for intentional acts is any func-
tion ISem : IActs → Noes ×Nmts × ℘(Objs), such that if, for any ia ∈ IActs,
one has ISem(ia) = (ns,nm, O) then it holds that:
• nm = S(ns), i.e., nm is the sense of ns;
• O = F(nm), i.e., O is the set of objects that fulﬁll nm;
• O = I(ns), i.e., O is the set of objects intended by ns;
and I = F ◦ S, so that the upper right triangle in Fig. 1 commutes.
Deﬁnition 2.4 An actional semantical function for intentional acts is any function
ASem : IActs → Noes × ℘(AActs) × ℘(Objs), such that if, for any ia ∈ IActs,
one has ASem(ia) = (ns, A,O), then it holds that:
• A = P(ns), i.e., A is the set of actions that can perform ns;
• O = A(A), i.e., O is the set of objects accessed by the actions of A;
• O = I(ns), i.e., O is the set of objects intended by ns;
and I = A ◦ P, so that the lower left triangle in Fig. 1 commutes.
The two types of semantical functions of intentional acts are shown in Fig. 2, as
Husserlian triangles.
We deﬁne a notion of compatibility between the intentional and the actional
semantical functions:
Deﬁnition 2.5 Given an intentional semantical function ISem : IActs → Noes×
Nmts × ℘(Objs) and an actional semantical function ASem : IActs → Noes ×
℘(AActs) × ℘(Objs), these two semantical functions are said to compatible with
each other if and only if, for any intentional act ia ∈ IActs, whenever ISem(ia) =
(ns,nm, O) and ASem(ia) = (ns ′, A,O) it holds that: ns = ns ′ and A = C(nm).
Two central concepts that we deﬁne are the following. First, the concept of
well-foundedness of a Husserilan square:
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Deﬁnition 2.6 A formally determined Husserlian square is well-founded only when
its intentional semantical function ISem : IActs → Noes ×Nmts × ℘(Objs) and
its actional semantical function ASem : IActs → Noes×℘(AActs)×℘(Objs) are
compatible with each other.
Second, the concept of an intentional act being well-deﬁned, relatively to a pair
of intentional and actional semantical functions:
Deﬁnition 2.7 Given the semantical functions ISem : IActs → Noes ×Nmts ×
℘(Objs) and ASem : IActs → Noes×℘(AActs)×℘(Objs), compatible with each
other, we say that an intentional act ia = (ns, aact ,nm, obj ) ∈ IActs is well deﬁned,
relatively to ISem and ASem, if and only if, whenever ISem(ia) = (ns,nm, O) and
ASem(ia) = (ns, A,O), it holds that: aact ∈ A and obj ∈ O.
In the following, we restrict ourselves to well-deﬁned intentional acts of well-
founded Husserlian squares.
3 Intentional Systems and the Temporal Evolution of
Intentional Processes
We deﬁne now intentional systems and their temporal evolutions:
Deﬁnition 3.1 An intentional system is a structure IS = (ip, ISR,ASR), where 7 :
• ip : T → IAct is the intentional process performed by IS ;
• ISR ∈ ℘(ISR) is a set of intentional semantical rules, which deﬁne the intentional
semantical function of the system;
• ASR ∈ ℘(ASR) is a set of actional semantical rules, which deﬁne the actional
semantical function of the system.
The temporal evolution of an intentional system, determined by its intentional
process, is given by:
Deﬁnition 3.2 Given the intentional system IS = (ip, ISR,ASR), the temporal
evolution of IS , determined by ip, is a sequence of intentional transitions :
ic0
R0−→ ic1 R1−→ ic2 . . .
where, for any time t:
• the stream ict = ipt.ict+1 = (nst, act t,nmt, ot).ict+1 is said to be the intentional
conﬁguration of the intentional system IS at the time t;
• for each conﬁguration transition ict R
t−→ ict+1, it happens that Rt is the rule of
conﬁguration transition (taken from ISR ∪ ASR) that is applied to the conﬁgu-
ration ict.
7 ISR is the set of all possible intentional semantical rules,ASR is the set of all possible actional semantical
rules.
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In the following, we restrict the intentional reactive processes to encompass just
two types of intentional acts:
• reactive intentional acts capable of ideating input actions, realized in the environ-
ment, as noeses of the form ↓(nm), which substitute the noema nm for the current
noema, whatever it is, in the current conﬁguration of the intentional system;
• reactive intentional acts capable of ideating input actions, realized in the envi-
ronment, as noeses of the form nm↓nm ′, which substitute the noema nm ′ for the
current noema nm in conﬁguration of the intentional system, with nm ′ possibly
being a function of nm.
We formally present in Fig. 3, in the natural deduction style introduced by
Plotkin [8], the intentional and actions semantical rules of the sample intentional
system we are considering.
To take into account the input and output actions of the reactive intentional
system, we have extended the structure of the conﬁgurations, in the rules of Fig. 3,
with the respective input and output processes, inp = 〈inp0, inp1, . . .〉 and out =
〈out0, out1, . . .〉, so that: ict = (inpt, [nst, act t,nmt, ot], out t).
Figure 4 illustrates the general aspect of the sequencing of reactive intentional
acts, in the temporal evolutions of the given reactive intentional system (with in-
put action enforcing the application of rule ASRinp1). Notice how the sequencing
organizes the temporal evolution in reactive cycles.
We remark the following about the semantical rules in Fig. 3:
• only the rules ASRinp1 and ASRinp1 can start a cycle; the cycles start with
conﬁgurations of the form (inp, [⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥], out);
• the intentional semantical rules take the compatibility conditions into account;
• the symbol ⊥ denotes an undeﬁned element;
• i.inp ′ denotes that inp has next input i and continuation inp ′; dually, out ′.o
denotes that out ′ is the sequence of outputs produced before the output o;
• PI denotes the input operation and the ideation to which it gives rise;
• rule ASRinp2 can only happen by interrupting an ongoing reaction;
• in the rule ASRout , the conﬁguration (inp,⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥, out .aact(obj)) marks the
successful completion of a reaction to a perception, the output of aact being
indicated by aact(obj).
• t + 3 is the earliest time at which a new input action can be realized without
interrupting the reactive cycle initiated by at time t.
Regarding the ﬁrst remark, notice that situations in which an input action is
available to be performed, and the current conﬁguration allows for the realization of
an output action, are the only situations where indeterminacy may arise. And that,
only between the realization of the input action (through rules ASRinp1 or ASRinp2),
and the realization of an output action (through rule ASRout). For the rest, the
temporal evolutions generated by the given transition rules are deterministic.
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Actional Semantical Rules:
PI[i] = ↓(nm)
ASRinp1
(i.inp, [ns, aact ,nm, obj ], out) → (inp, [↓(nm),⊥,⊥,⊥], out)
PI[i] = (nm)↓(nm ′)
ASRinp2
(i.inp, [↓(nm), aact ,nm, obj ], out) → (inp, [↓(nm ′), aact ,nm, obj ], out)
ASRout
(inp, [ns, aact ,nm, obj ], out) → (inp, [⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥], out .aact(o))
Intentional Semantical Rule:
aact ∈ P[↓(nm)] aact ∈ C[nm] obj ∈ F[nm] obj ∈ I[↓(nm)]
ISR↓(nm)
(inp, [↓(nm),⊥,⊥,⊥], out) → (inp, [↓(nm), aact ,nm, obj ], out)
Fig. 3. The intentional and actional semantical rules of the sample formal semantics of intentional processes.
Fig. 4. A reactive intentional cycle of the temporal evolution generated by the rules of Fig. 3.
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4 Case Study: A Constative Intentional System and its
Formal Model
4.1 Judgments and Constative Intentional Processes
We take a judgement (or constative intentional act 8 ) to be an intentional act whose
noema is a proposition, and we take a proposition to be an idea that a predication
is true of an object of a given type.
A (pure) constative intentional process is an intentional process whose inten-
tional actions are all constative, that is, are all judgements. A constative intentional
process is said to be impure if it contains other types of acts, besides intentional
ones.
That a predication is true of an object constitutes what can be called a fact.
Thus, we may say that the noema of a constative intentional act, which is a propo-
sition, when it is fulﬁlled, it is fulﬁlled by a fact.
In a strict sense, a fact fulﬁlls a proposition if and only if (i) the fact is constituted
by a predication that is true of an object, (ii) the object and the predication are
those speciﬁed by the judgment 9 .
In a more general sense, one admits that facts may fulﬁll propositions only in a
partial way (as is the case of any object, regarding a noema). The fulﬁllment of a
proposition by a fact is partial if (i) either the object (or the predication, or both)
only partially fulﬁlls the condition of being of the type speciﬁed by the proposition
and/or (ii) the predication is true of the object only in a partial way.
4.2 The Informal Presentation of the Case Study
Let’s consider a software agent ag that is responsible for checking the complete-
ness of a repository of learning objects LOR against a list of requirements. Fig. 5
illustrates the situation:
• ag is the agent ;
• LOR is the repository of learning objects;
• pct is the operation of perception, through which ag accesses LOR;
• id is the operation of ideation, through which ag constructs Husserlian squares
for the objects in LOR;
• the tuples of the form (ns , aact ,nm, obj ) constitute the Husserlian squares, one
for each checking of objects in LOR.
Let’s assume that the checking should proceed on the basis of the agent ag
receiving periodically, from another agent ag ′, a request to check if the repository
LOR satisﬁes some speciﬁc requirement, and let’s consider only the following types
8 Clearly, we took the term “constative” from Austin [1]
9 We keep undetermined here the detailed speciﬁcation of when one may say that a predication is true of
an object and when one may say that an object (or a predication) fulﬁlls the condition of being of a given
type. See discussion in Sect. 5, regarding the latter point.
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Fig. 5. Case study: agent ag checking the repository of learning objects LOR.
of requirements: (i) minimum number of learning objects, (ii) presence of a speciﬁc
learning object, and (iii) maximum number of versions of a speciﬁc learning object.
We denote by rq the sequence of requests that ag receives from ag ′, and by rp
the replies that ag gives to ag ′, one for each request it receives.
We take rq to be rq = 〈rq0, rq1, . . .〉 where each request rq t is of one of the types:
• check(num-los ≥ n): check if there are at least n learning objects in LOR;
• check(exists(lo)): check if the learning object lo is in LOR;
• check(num-vers(lo) ≤ n)): check if the number of versions of the learning object
lo is less than or equal to n.
with rp correspondingly being rp = rp0, rp1, . . . where each reply rpt is one of the
values, True or False.
4.3 An Intentional Semantical Function for the Constative Intentional Acts
Table 1 shows one possible intentional semantical function for the constative inten-
tional acts of the agent ag .
Notice that, for the sake of space, we have not indicated the full objects of
the constative intentional acts (which are facts, since the noemata of such acts are
propositions), but just the thing (or pair of things) to which the noemata refer.
Notice, however, that such things are not the things that exist in LOR, but
are 10 the things that the perception operation is capable of handling to ag , and
that ag is capable of ideating.
These perceived things do not necessarily coincide completely and faithfully with
what really is in LOR. That’s why such things are marked with the preﬁx p- in the
table.
On the other hand, notice that we are assuming, in this case study, that every
(perceived) object completely fulﬁlls its respective noema.
Finally, notice that, since the requests from ag ′ are supposed to be independent
of each other, every new request that arrives causes the creation of a new noema
10As Husserl repeatedly emphasized [6].
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Type of
Constative Act Noesis Noema Things
check(num-los ≥ n) ↓(num-los (p-LOR)) ≥ n) num-los (p-LOR) ≥ n p-LOR
check(exists(lo)) ↓(exists(p-lo, p-LOR))) exists(p-lo, p-LOR) (p-lo, p-LOR))
check(num-vers(lo) ≤ n) ↓(num-vers(p-lo, p-LOR) ≤ n) num-vers(p-lo, p-LOR) ≤ n (p-lo, p-LOR)
Table 1
The intentional semantical function for the constative intentional acts of ag.
Type of
Constative Act Noesis
Access
Actions
Things
check(num-los ≥ n) ↓(num-los (p-LOR)) ≥ n) m<-number-los(p-LOR));
return eval(m >= n)
p-LOR
check(exists(lo)) ↓(exists(p-lo, p-LOR))) return eval(p-lo in p-LOR) (p-lo, p-LOR))
check(num-vers(lo) ≤ n) ↓(num-vers(p-lo) ≤ n) m <- num-vers(p-lo,p-LOR);
return eval(m <= n)
(p-lo, p-LOR)
Table 2
The actional semantical function for the constative intentional acts of ag.
in the intentional process performed by ag . That’s why all the noeses are of the
↓(nm) type.
4.4 An Actional Semantical Function for the Constative Intentional Acts
Given any intentional semantical function isem for the constative intentional acts
of ag , any proposed actional semantical function asem for those acts can be tested
for its compatibility with isem.
Table 2 gives an actional semantical function for the constative intentional acts
of ag that is compatible with the intentional semantical function given in Table 1.
In the present case study, there is a natural notion of compatibility between
the two semantical functions. Since we are expressing the access actions of the
constative intentional acts in algorithmic terms, and given that the noemata of the
constative intentional acts are propositions, the natural notion of compatibility is
simply that of taking the noemata as correctness conditions for the algorithms that
represent the access actions.
For instance, concerning the constative intentional action check(num-los ≥ n)
one has only to prove the truth of the correctness condition:
pre: True
{m<-number-los(p-LOR));return eval(m >= n)}
post: num-los(p-LOR) ≥ n
That the algorithm terminates, it is immediately sure.
4.5 The Temporal Evolution of the Constative Intentional Process
As mentioned before, the requests sent to the checking agent ag are supposed to
be independent of each other. Thus, the noesis of every intentional act in the
intentional process of requests is of the form ↓(nm).
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In such condition, the temporal evolution of the intentional process consists,
simply, in the temporal succession of sequences of steps like that shown in Fig. 4,
since no intentional act builds on the previous one.
Since all the requests in rq have the form ↓nm, the only rules that are applicable
to the intentional process are the rules ASRinp1 ,ASRout and ISR↓(nm) (see Fig. 3).
Thus, if:
rq = 〈check(num-los ≥ 0), check(exists(lo1)), check(num-vers(lo1) ≤ 10), . . .〉
is the beginning of a sequence of requests, and the learning object repository that
ag perceives, p-LOR, is such that:
• there are learning objects in p-LOR;
• the learning object p-lo1 exists in p-LOR;
• there are more then 10 versions of the learning object p-lo1 in p-LOR;
the temporal evolution of the intentional process performed by ag , in the given
intentional system, has the initial part shown in Fig. 6, where 11 :
• ε denotes the empty sequence;
• at each step, we have omitted the continuation of the input sequence as well the
beginning of the output sequence (indicated by the mark “∼”);
• the initial conﬁguration is completely undetermined, except for the input se-
quence;
• comments are inserted within braces.
5 Discussion, Related Works, and Conclusion
5.1 Husserlian Semantics and its Alternatives
We submit here, building on the exposition above, that one advantage of adopting
an intentional approach to the modeling of computational systems, specially if in
accordance with Husserl’s prespective [6], is the completeness of the treatment of
the semantical issues of the languages involved in such types of systems.
To see that, one can directly compare the scope of semantical issues tackled by
the perspecive introduced here, with the scope of semantical issues tackled by the
usual semantical perspectives adopted in formal language systems (for both logical
language systems, see e.g. [2], and computational language systems, see e.g. [3]).
In Fig. 8, we show the diﬀerences, regarding the semantical scopes, between the
Husserlian semantical perspective, the logical perspective (which encompasses most
of the semantics of computational languages) and the empiricist perspectives. The
latter perspectives are the most common alternatives to the Husserlian one.
Checking against Fig. 1, one sees that logical semantics suppresses subjectivity
from language, while empiricist semantics suppresses subjectivity and eideticity.
11Compare with the generic temporal structure of the process cycles, shown in Fig. 4.
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{initial conﬁguration:}
(check(num-los ≥ 0).check(exists(lo1)).check(num-vers(lo1) ≤ 10).∼ ,
[⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥],
ε)
ASRinp1−→ {ideate next input}
(check(exists(lo1)).check(num-vers(lo1) ≤ 10).∼ ,
[↓(num-los (p-LOR)) ≥ 0),⊥,⊥,⊥],
ε)
ISR↓(nm)−→ {determine actionality and intentionality}
(check(exists(lo1)).check(num-vers(lo1) ≤ 10).∼ ,
[↓(num-los (p-LOR)) ≥ 0), m<-number-los(p-LOR));
return eval(m >= 0)
,num-los (p-LOR) ≥ 0, p-LOR],
ε)
ASRout−→ {complete the access action}
(check(exists(lo1)).check(num-vers(lo1) ≤ 10).∼ ,
[⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥],
True)
ASRinp1−→ {ideate next input}
(check(num-vers(lo1) ≤ 10).∼ ,
[↓(exists(p-lo, p-LOR))),⊥,⊥,⊥],
True)
ISR↓(nm)−→ {determine actionality and intentionality}
(check(num-vers(lo1) ≤ 10).∼ ,
[↓(exists(p-lo, p-LOR))), return eval(p-lo in LOR), exists(p-lo, p-LOR), (p-lo, p-LOR))],
True)
ASRout−→ {complete the access action}
(check(num-vers(lo1) ≤ 10).∼ ,
[⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥],
True.True)
ASRinp1−→ {ideate next input}
(∼ ,
[↓(num-vers(p-lo) ≤ 10),⊥,⊥,⊥],
True)
ISR↓(nm)−→ {determine actionality and intentionality}
(∼ ,
[↓(num-vers(p-lo) ≤ 10), m<-num-vers(p-lo,LOR),
return eval(m >= n)
,num-vers(p-lo, p-LOR) ≥ 10; (p-lo, p-LOR))],
True)
ASRout−→ {complete the access action}
(∼ ,
[⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥],
True.True.False) {which is the conﬁguration at the end of the initial part the process}
Fig. 6. The initial part of the temporal evolution of the constative intentional process of the agent ag.
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Fig. 7. The place of language in the Husserlian square.
Fig. 8. The alternative semantical perspectives.
Logical semantics, even though reducing the semantical range, compared with
the Husserlian semantics, still contemplates the eidetic elements that pertain to
language, as one can see in the classical understanding of logical expressions in
terms of connotations and denotations. The same can also be seen in the work
on intensional semantics, dealing with intensions and extensions (see, e.g. [7]).
Empiricist semantics, on the other hand, strives to drastically restrict language to
its sole relation to objects, an option strongly criticized by Husserl [5].
The value of the Husserlian semantical perspective, for works aiming to account
for languages in formal models of intentional systems, should be clear, now: both
the eidetic and the ontic semantical aspects of languages receive proper space, as
well as their objective and subjective aspects, as clearly shown in Fig. 7.
5.2 Phenomenological Approaches and the of Intentional Agents
As shown in Fig. 1, the Husserlian phenomenological perspective contemplates four
essential aspects of intentionality, namely, the eidetic and the ontic, as well as the
subjective and the objective.
Thus, not only a complete approach to the intentional systems and the semantics
of their languages can be developed, by adopting the Husserlian perspective: a
complete approach can also be developed to the structure and operation of the
agents that concretely realize those intentional systems.
In particular, the fact that subjectiveness is taken into account in the Husserlian
perspective, allows a large space for the issue of the individuality of those agents.
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Fig. 9. The computational and the original Husserlian intentional perspectives.
5.3 Phenomenological Reduction and Phenomenological Expansion
Finally, a more general consideration should be made here. There is a contrast
between the computationally oriented approach to Husserl’s intentional perspective,
introduced here, and Husserl’s original intentional perspective [6]. This is easily
seen in Fig. 9.
The whole diﬀerence resides in the directions of the relationships of performance,
fulﬁllment and access: P, F and A, in the computational approach, and P−1, F−1
and A−1, in the original one.
This is so because, in the original Husserlian approach, the ontic level is taken
as given, and the phenomenological eﬀort is to achieve the eidetic level that cor-
responds to that ontic level. To allow for that achievement, Husserl elaborated
his well-known operation of phenomenological reduction, which, given mental access
actions and objects, returns their respective noeses and noemata.
In the computational approach proposed here, on the other hand, the aim goes
in the opposite direction. We start from the eidetic level, and we search for an ontic
level that can adequately realize to it. The operation thus required is not that of
phenomenological reduction, but the inverse one, of phenomenological expansion,
which Husserl only brieﬂy mentions [6].
In fact, as the problem we have is that of choosing particular access actions
and objects to realize the eidetic level, the operation we need here, and that we
formalized in the paper, is a choice-based particularization of the phenomenological
expansion, an operation that we call phenomenological realization.
Thus, the critical issue in determining the adequacy of an ontic structure to an
eidetic one, in the computational approach, is the determination of the compatibility
C between them, which can not be deduced from P and S (see those functions in
the computational square, in Fig. 9).
Husserl, on his turn, had no explicit concern with access actions, generally di-
rected from the agent to the intented objects. On the contrary, what he was con-
cerned solely with was the operation that goes in the opposite direction, namely,
intuition, with perception being the prototypical one [6]. Also, Husserl seemed to
have assumed that the eidetic elements (noeses, noemata) obtained by ideation, on
the basis of intuition, were always correct by construction, as it were. Naturally,
then, he seemed to have never been concerned with adequation issues, e.g., with the
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compatibility relationship C.
However, given that Husserl’s aimed at a conceptual level (the eidetic) from
a distinct one (the ontic), an adequation issue had to appear. Since his perfor-
mance and fulﬁllment functions were taken in the inverse direction (P−1 and F−1,
in Fig. 9), the critical problem of adequacy appeared not in the determination of
the compatibility relationship C, but in the determination of the intentionality re-
lationship. For, in the formal setting that he established, I = F−1 ◦ S can not be
deductively established, and obtained “by construction”.
In fact, Husserl’s original intentionality problem may be formally construed, in
his terms, as follows (see Fig. 9):
Original Husserlian problem: Given a theoretical understanding of how noeses
relate to noemata (through the arrow S), an object and its intuition (given through
the access arrow A−1 between them), to ﬁnd a noesis (an ideation of an intuition)
and corresponding P−1, and a noemata (an ideation of the intuited object) and
corresponding F−1, such that the triangle S = F−1 ◦ I commutes.
In the computational approach, on the other hand, the intentionality of a noesis
is trivially implied by the sense and the fulﬁllment functions of its noema: one has
immediately that I = F ◦ S.
The general problem that the computational modeling introduced here, then, is
another one, namely:
Computational Husserlian problem: Given a noesis, a noemata and the theoret-
ical understanding of how they relate (through the arrow S), ﬁnd access actions,
accessed objects and arrow A such that both the triangles I = F ◦ S and P = S ◦ C
commute.
The essential reason for the diﬀerences in the approaches can be clearly stated, thus:
• Husserl’s aim seems to have been that of grasping the phenomenological aspects
of the natural world, which is obviously already given to all of us, daily.
• Our aim is to make use of Husserl’s results to contribute to computer science and
the computational technology, whose main objects are artifacts that, after being
speciﬁed and designed in an ideal way, have yet to be constructed and put into
operation in the given natural world.
To use Searle’s terminology [9], while phenomenological reduction refers to the
mind-world direction of intentionality, phenomenological expansion refers to its
world-mind direction of intentionality, and it is with the latter that we have been
centrally concerned here.
5.4 The Role of Domain Theory
We have not given a treatment for the notion of a object fulﬁlling a noema. Given
the type-theoretic nature of the formalization introduced in the paper, it seems
only natural to treat treat noemata as ideal speciﬁcations of objects, and the no-
tion of fulﬁllment of that ideal speciﬁcation in terms of a partial approximation or
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completion of objects toward their full-ﬂedged forms, as given by their noemata.
Such relation of approximation or completion between partial and total objects
has been extensively studied in Domain Theory [4]. It can be assumed, then, that
a promising approach to the formal account of the relation between objects and
noemata can be attempted on the basis of that theory.
Analogously, the approximation relation between noeses and access actions can
perhaps also be formally accounted for in terms of Domain Theory.
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